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Economists advocate that the billions of public dollars spent on conservation should be allocated  2 
to achieve the largest possible social benefit. This is what we term “cost-effective conservation”--  3 
a process that incorporates both benefits and costs that are measured with money. This  4 
controversial proposition has been poorly understood and not implemented by conservation  5 
planners. Drawing from evidence from the largest conservation programs in the United States,  6 
this paper seeks to improve the communication between economists and planners and overcome  7 
resistance to cost-effective conservation by addressing the open questions that likely drive  8 
skepticism among non-economists and by identifying best practices for project selection. We first  9 
delineate project-selection strategies and compare them to optimization. Then we synthesize the  10 
body of established research findings from economics into 20 practical lessons. Based on theory,  11 
policy considerations, and empirical evidence, these lessons illustrate the potential gains from  12 
improving practices related to cost-effective selection and also address how to overcome  13 
landowner-incentive challenges that face programs.  14 1. Introduction and Policy Setting  15 
Governments should use conservation policies to enhance the benefits to society in lieu of fully  16 
functional markets for ecosystem services. These policies conserve land by requiring or  17 
incentivizing landowners to protect habitat for endangered species, control erosion, enhance  18 
riparian buffers and wetlands. They also preserve agricultural and forest land by purchasing land  19 
outright or purchasing conservation easements to preclude development. While conservation  20 
activity exists throughout the world, most of these efforts are less effective than they could be.  21 
Drawing from evidence from conservation programs in the United States this paper reviews the  22 
process by which governments and large non-governmental organizations pursue conservation  23 
and recommends best practices that will enhance conservation outcomes.   24 
At a fundamental level, economists recommend that conservation planning should  25 
account for all of the social benefits resulting from a project, regardless of to whom they accrue,  26 
rather than focusing on environmental benefits alone. These policies should ensure that these  27 
social benefits are as large as possible given constrained conservation budgets. Cost-effective  28 
project selection is a process that incorporates both benefits and costs that are measured  29 
commensurately with money and seeks to maximize the conservation outcomes important to the  30 
public. This type of approach delivers the “best bang for the buck” and any other selection  31 
approach sacrifices some achievable benefits. While an economically efficient solution is to  32 
pursue all conservation projects for which the social benefit exceeds the social cost,  33 
unfortunately, limited budgets for conservation generally preclude such an effort. Thus, we focus  34 
on cost-effectiveness rather than efficiency and study the complexities of optimal project  35   4
selection. These complexities include conflicting incentives, selection challenges, dynamic  36 
effects, interdependencies, and uncertainties.  37 
The use of the terms cost-effective conservation in this review should not be confused  38 
with cost-effectiveness analysis, a decision science method, which is common in health  39 
economics and has been used in some literature related to conservation selection.  Cost- 40 
effectiveness analysis explicitly excludes measuring benefits in monetary terms, which we show  41 
in this manuscript can often lead to suboptimal conservation outcomes.  42 
Allocating funds to achieve the greatest possible conservation benefit—the economic  43 
concept of cost-effectiveness—remains controversial among academics and lacks widespread  44 
adoption by conservation planners, policymakers, conservation program architects, and funders  45 
(hereafter referred to collectively as “planners”). Although many papers in the conservation  46 
planning literature identify the advantages of cost-effective conservation, several recent papers  47 
have argued against this growing push because the complex interaction between humans and  48 
nature exceeds the capacity of traditional economic methods (Arponen et al. 2010; Gowdy et al.  49 
2010). Such critiques arise close to the heart of economics and complement long-standing  50 
objections to the use of benefit-cost analysis. For instance, Odling-Smee (2005:616) points out  51 
that some see efforts to monetize nature as violating “ethical and spiritual dimensions of  52 
conservation.”  While acknowledging these critiques, we believe that modern economic  53 
valuation techniques can provide some measurement of these values and targets this manuscript  54 
at the practical problems of improving the effectiveness of current conservation programs.   55 
Conservation expenditures are rapidly increasing. The U.S. Farm Bill covering 2008- 56 
2012 allocates $11.7 billion to working lands programs such as the Environmental Quality  57   5
Incentives Program (EQIP), $1 billion to agricultural land preservation, and $13 billion to land  58 
retirement programs such as the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) (author calculation based  59 
on data reported in Claassen (2010)). U.S. federal conservation expenditures represent a $7.8  60 
billion increase over the prior baseline (Hajkowicz et al. 2009), and yet this still understates  61 
conservation efforts because it does not include state, local, and nongovernmental conservation  62 
activity. Private U.S. land preservation by 1,667 land trusts and nongovernmental organizations  63 
had protected 37 million acres by 2005, with total preservation doubling between 2000 and 2005  64 
(Aldrich & Wyerman 2006). Furthermore, the federal government and states spent at least $11.1  65 
billion on endangered species recovery between 1989 and 2004 (Langpap & Kerkvilet 2010).  66 
Conservation efforts in the European Union (EU) may exceed those in the U.S.; for instance,  67 
between 2007 and 2013 the EU plans to spend €35.4 billion on agri-environmental payments  68 
alone (author calculation based on data from the EU (2009)). Governments throughout the world  69 
pursue conservation. For instance, in New South Wales, Australia, the Environmental Services  70 
Scheme provides incentives to alter private land management in an effort to improve delivery of  71 
environmental services (Oliver et al. 2005). Finally, China’s Sloping Land Conversion Program,  72 
perhaps the world’s largest conservation program with an estimated budget of $48 billion, seeks  73 
to convert crop and wasteland to forests (Xu et al. 2010).  74 
Evidence suggests challenges in communication between planners, policymakers, and  75 
economists. Banzhaf (2010: 592), in part, faults economists’ for their “lack of interest in making  76 
academic work accessible”. Prendergast et al. (1999: 484) cites a lack of awareness and  77 
understanding as possible obstacles to using theoretically driven conservation planning, as well  78 
as limited funds and even “antipathy” toward “prescriptive” selection tools. Planners may also  79   6
resist cost-effectiveness because they are not familiar with optimization mathematics and lack  80 
tools for implementation amongst numerous other reasons (Ferraro and Pattanayak 2006; Messer  81 
et al. 2011). Calls for greater dialogue and collaboration are long-standing (Prendergast et al.  82 
1999; Armsworth et al. 2004). It is this lack of constructive communication, cooperation, and  83 
resistance to economic approaches that motivates this synthesis.  84 
  85 
2. Methods  86 
The scientific literature on the practice of cost-effective conservation is vast, and a book-length  87 
treatment would be required to review it all.  In addition, there is an applied literature that  88 
evaluates certain programs and a call for more work in this area (Laycock et al. 2009; Ferraro  89 
and Pattanayak 2006). Existing syntheses, therefore, focus on somewhat narrow aspects. One  90 
rationale for this work is to present cost-effective conservation in a new and, hopefully, more  91 
useful package for planners. This section explains how literature was selected and organized. We  92 
briefly review existing approaches before turning to the one in this paper.  93 
Claassen et al. (2008) offered a comprehensive review of the CRP and EQIP and found,  94 
in part, that existing rules delivered were better than some alternative selection processes, but  95 
were still not truly cost effectiveness. Wu (2004) summarized many of the challenges to cost- 96 
effective conservation and focused on impediments associated with the policy process and  97 
complexities associated with the resources targeted for protection. Newburn et al. (2005)  98 
comprehensively assesses cost-effective conservation in light of vulnerability. Sarkar et al.  99 
(2006) synthesized the concepts, techniques, and software available for optimal biodiversity  100 
conservation planning. Most similar in approach to our paper is Wilson et al. (2009), which  101   7
offered lessons about setting priorities in biodiversity planning.  Wilson et al. (2009) identified  102 
specific challenges to prioritizing conservation—including temporal issues, uncertainty, and  103 
spatial heterogeneity, and drew conclusions about the need for location-specific planning.   104 
Unlike prior syntheses, we offer 20 lessons to assist planners make more cost-effective  105 
decisions with their limited resources, thereby increasing the supply of ecosystem services.  106 
Practical guidance grounded in research is needed because, as Prendergast et al. (1999) argued,  107 
the benefits of cost-effectiveness frequently fail to reach planners who make actual conservation  108 
decisions. Several lessons presented in this paper arise from recent research while others are  109 
practical guidance original to this work. In addition, this paper offers a broad, and therefore  110 
shallow, perspective to complement other syntheses offering topical depth. Finally, the paper  111 
also highlights areas where research has identified significant challenges in conservation  112 
planning. Explicit recognition of the current challenges facing cost-effective conservation  113 
hopefully will help build credibility with potential adopters and clarify future research agendas.  114 
Economic research in conservation tends to focus on empirical analyses of and challenges  115 
to the practice of conservation because the theory of optimal selection is relatively  116 
straightforward. Therefore, the next section briefly summarizes the theory and defines cost- 117 
effective conservation. We then distill the literature into 20 best-practice lessons and organize  118 
these lessons into five sections (summarized in table 1): optimal selection, benefits, costs,  119 
budgets, and incentive problems.  120 
  121 
3. Theory: Cost-Effective Project Selection  122   8
Planners typically pursue conservation benefits, such as biodiversity, habitat provision,  123 
agricultural land quality, and air quality, and use benefit indices to measure the benefits that  124 
would arise from investment in a project.  For example, the CRP and the Wetlands Reserve  125 
Program in the United States assign relative weights, which are periodically adjusted for each  126 
type of environmental benefit targeted (Cattaneo et al. 2006). These weights substantively impact  127 
project priorities but there is little guidance on how to sum these benefits when they are  128 
incommensurate. Hajkowicz et al. (2009) conducted an assessment of programs that use benefit  129 
indices and recommended better incorporation of social preferences in the weights (measured  130 
with appropriate techniques) and development of standardized indices.   131 
Measuring the costs of conservation, such as acquisition, transaction, monitoring, and  132 
stewardship costs, is more straightforward because existing markets often reveal these values.  133 
Nevertheless, Ando et al. (1998) notes that costs are not widely incorporated in conservation  134 
decisions. Ignoring costs may have once made sense when the goal was protection of unique  135 
natural amenities such as the national parks of Yellowstone or the Grand Canyon. However,  136 
current conservation practices extend to many settings where programs must decide where to  137 
invest their limited funds among a number of high-quality projects that are close substitutes in  138 
terms of environmental benefits but differ substantially in cost. In these settings, paying too  139 
much can significantly reduce the benefits from conservation efforts.  140 
Selection strategies that focus on only one measure—benefit targeting or cost targeting— 141 
consistently lead to suboptimal results. Strategies that include both costs and benefits, such as  142 
benefit-cost targeting, benefit maximization targeting, and mathematical programming methods,  143 
are being adopted, albeit slowly. This section distinguishes these techniques.  144   9
Benefit targeting (BT), also termed “benefit ranking” or “rank-based model” ranks  145 
projects according to their environmental benefit and selects the highest-ranking ones until the  146 
budget is exhausted (Ferraro 2003). It is used frequently for private and public conservation  147 
programs, such as the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (Wu 2004), for the establishment of  148 
national parks (Babcock et al. 1997; Wu et al. 2001). BT has intuitive appeal to many  149 
conservationists, who are drawn to projects with the largest environmental benefits. However,  150 
BT ignores cost as a selection criterion, and the outcome is likely to be cost-ineffective because  151 
the budget can be exhausted by a couple of high-benefit, high-cost projects (Messer 2006).   152 
Cost targeting (CT) ranks projects solely by acquisition cost and selects the least  153 
expensive ones until the budget is depleted—a “bargain shopper” tactic (Ferraro 2003). In  154 
practice, CT tends to maximize acreage rather than net benefit (Babcock et al. 1997). Pure CT  155 
seems to be relatively rare in practice, though examples exist. Babcock et al. (1997), for  156 
example, framed the CRP’s early efforts as equivalent to CT. Another related example is the  157 
Delaware Agricultural Lands Preservation (DALP) program that uses a reverse auction—an  158 
auction with one buyer and multiple sellers—and selects projects based on the level of discount  159 
offered by owners on the appraised development increment (Messer and Allen 2010).  160 
Benefit targeting with a cost adjustment is similar to BT but scores conservation costs as  161 
a nonmonetary benefit measure. For example, Ribaudo et al. (2001) calculated that the cost  162 
factor score used by the CRP represents 27% of total possible points, subject to soil quality, in  163 
the Environmental Benefits Index. While this strategy may have intuitive appeal because it  164 
seems to analyze costs and benefits jointly, it is not truly cost-effective (Hajkowicz et al. 2009)  165   10
as it is easy to construct examples where scoring costs as a benefit leads to sub-optimal  166 
environmental results.   167 
Benefit-cost targeting (BCT) selects projects with the highest benefit-cost ratios until the  168 
budget is exhausted. This approach ensures selection of individual projects that have the highest  169 
benefit per dollar, which will achieve no worse and typically greater cost-effectiveness than BT  170 
or CT (Babcock et al. 1996). This characteristic leads many economists to promote BCT (Ferraro  171 
2003). In fact, U.S. federal programs, such as the CRP and EQIP, use a version of BCT that  172 
seeks to maximize environmental benefit per dollar spent (Wu et al. 2001), however, since cost is  173 
measured as a benefit index true cost-effectiveness is not achieved.  174 
Wu et al. (2001) and Wu (2004) described how characteristics of commodity markets  175 
might create secondary impacts that prevent BCT from maximizing total net social benefits in  176 
some conservation settings. These technical distinctions led to an improved selection strategy:  177 
benefit-maximization targeting. Benefit-maximization targeting selects projects to minimize  178 
increases in commodity output prices and, thus, slippage (described later) and achieves the same  179 
level of environmental benefit as BCT but at a lower cost (Wu 2004).  In principle, benefit- 180 
maximization targeting is fully cost-effective; however, the literature has tended to employ  181 
relatively simple problems to demonstrate this technique. Because project selection occurs in a  182 
complex world of constraints and interdependencies, true cost-effectiveness requires even more  183 
advanced techniques.   184 
Optimization involves a set of mathematical programming algorithms, such as binary  185 
linear programming and goal programming, from operations research that seek to maximize total  186 
net benefits and achieves cost-effectiveness in more complex situations, such as a need to enroll  187   11
a minimum number of acres, to maximize the number of species preserved, to select a minimum  188 
number of projects from a particular region, or to meet disparate goals (Underhill 1994; Sarkar et  189 
al. 2006; Balmford et al. 2000; Kaiser & Messer 2011; Fooks & Messer, forthcoming).  190 
Optimization algorithms can identify optimal selections when ecological complexities such as  191 
thresholds introduce jointness to the selection of projects, a problem investigated by Wu et al.  192 
(2000) and Wu (2004). In addition, these techniques can offer slight advantages over iterative  193 
selection techniques, such as BCT, by adjusting to account for budget remainders (Messer 2006).  194 
  195 
4. Twenty Lessons for Cost-Effective Selection Processes  196 
4.1 Optimal Selection  197 
Lesson 1: Benefit targeting and cost targeting can lead to suboptimal project selection. The  198 
weakness of these approaches can be demonstrated with a numerical example provided in table  199 
2, which gives hypothetical data for prioritization of six conservation projects using costs and  200 
monetized benefits. The second panel of table 2 compares the projects selected with a budget of  201 
$6 by several ordinal (ranking) and cardinal (quantity) prioritizations arising from BT (column I)  202 
and CT (column J) with the selections made by optimization using monetized benefit-cost ratios  203 
(column L). In this example, net benefits are maximized at $44 by selecting projects A, B, and C.  204 
BT and CT prioritizations are suboptimal at a net benefit of $40 and $43 respectively.  205 
Empirical evidence supports the hypothetical example, and the magnitude of the cost- 206 
ineffectiveness can be substantial. In an application to endangered species protection, Ando et al.  207 
(1998) found savings of as much as 75% when costs were systematically accounted for. Messer  208 
and Allen (2010) examined the DALP program and showed that optimal selection would have  209   12
preserved the same number of acres with an equal benefit score but would have saved  210 
approximately $21 million relative to DALP’s CT system (more than 20% savings) and  211 
substantially more if DALP had used BT. In the case of conservation of terrestrial vertebrates in  212 
Oregon, incorporating land costs would have generated a ten-fold improvement in cost- 213 
effectiveness (Polasky et al. 2001). Recent adoption of BCT in Baltimore County, Maryland,  214 
resulted in protection of an additional 680 high-quality agricultural acres—saving $5.4 million— 215 
compared to BT in just three years (Kaiser & Messer 2011:271).   216 
Fully optimal methods require substantial data. However, several studies suggest that  217 
policymakers might approach optimal selection even if some data are unavailable. This depends  218 
on what one knows about the distribution of unobserved costs and benefits. When benefits and  219 
costs are uncorrelated, BT performs better when benefits vary more than costs —and vice versa  220 
for CT (Babcock et al. 1997). A number of studies have examined optimal selection with  221 
observed data on variability of costs and/or benefits (Ando et al. 1998; Balmford et al. 2003;  222 
Ferraro 2003; Perhans et al. 2008) and evaluated selection performance without complete data  223 
(Babcock et al. 1997; Ferraro 2003; Perhans et al. 2008). In general, positive statistical  224 
correlation between a project’s costs and benefits tends to improve the performance of BCT  225 
relative to BT or CT, while a negative correlation leads to more similar performances for the  226 
three methods (Babcock et al. 1997).  227 
Lesson 2: Efforts to distribute conservation funds evenly across political  228 
jurisdictions will tend to be suboptimal. The political process and perceptions of fairness may  229 
introduce constraints. For example, the CRP limits program participation to 25% of cropland in  230 
any county to protect local economies (Sullivan et al. 2004), and Pennsylvania’s agricultural land  231   13
preservation program distributes money to all participating counties, each administering  232 
individual programs (3 P.S. § 914.1(b,h)). Such constraints reduce cost-effectiveness because  233 
they restrict the feasible set of solutions and, by definition, cannot improve the cost-effectiveness  234 
of the solution (Kaiser & Messer 2011). These constraints also can work against efforts to target  235 
conservation in settings where biological thresholds are important (Wu et al. 2000, Wu &  236 
Boggess 1999; Wu & Skelton-Groth 2002; Wu 2004). The political reality, however, is that  237 
distributing funds across jurisdictions may help secure broad legislative support for a program.  238 
Likewise, nongovernmental organizations may win political favors or improve fundraising by, at  239 
times, focusing on high-profile projects.  240 
  241 
4.2 Benefits  242 
Lesson 3: Measure conservation benefits that are positive externalities. Gardner (1977)  243 
provided an early summary of fundamental economic concerns about emerging land preservation  244 
policies. Because some of its points remain underappreciated while others have been  245 
misunderstood, revisiting Gardner’s arguments is worthwhile.   246 
Gardner notes that policy interventions in land markets can increase total social benefits  247 
if there is a market failure, but they reduce the productivity of scarce resources if no failure  248 
exists. Gardner found a land market failure in the under-provision of public goods—in other  249 
words, land markets provide too few ecosystem services. Termed external benefits or positive  250 
externalities, such services include wildlife habitat, water quality protection, scenic views, and  251 
carbon sequestration. Landowners rationally undersupply them because existing markets do not  252 
fully capture the social benefits of their decisions. Gardner’s argument implies that external  253   14
benefits should be measured and then policy should internalize them by incentivizing  254 
conservation. Gardner correctly anticipated that policymakers would incentivize easy-to-measure  255 
benefits such as soil quality and, thus, cautioned that increasing the supply of such benefits does  256 
not clearly enhance resource allocation efficiency because no obvious market failure exists for  257 
soil quality (i.e., farmers already pay more for high-quality land). Instead, Gardner argued that  258 
appropriate conservation benefit measures reflect factors that are external to markets and are  259 
associated with benefits that accrue to neighbors and the general public.    260 
  Lesson 4: Measure benefits to the public, not to experts. The logic for this potentially  261 
controversial lesson is that the public is the group that receives the services. The economic  262 
literature offers evidence that the conservation preferences of experts may or may not diverge  263 
from those of the public (Strager & Rosenberger 2006; Columbo 2009). While this lesson may  264 
not be relevant to private conservation organizations as they are driven by their donor priorities,  265 
it does apply to government agencies and perhaps also to larger conservation organizations.  266 
Some public preferences can be measured or estimated (see Kline 2006). We acknowledge that  267 
this lesson may be challenging to follow when the conservation benefits are associated with  268 
ecosystem services that the public is unlikely to fully understand, such as implications of specific  269 
pollutant loads or habitat needs for an endangered species.   270 
Lesson 5: Monetize benefit measures. Monetized benefit measures (conservation  271 
benefits measured in dollar terms) are required for cost-effective policy because they must be  272 
balanced with the costs of conservation, which are often largely monetized—Kido & Seidl  273 
(2008) apply such techniques to develop optimal protected area entry fees. Conservation  274 
programs tend to use benefit indices derived from agri-environmental criteria such as soil  275   15
quality, crop productivity, soil erosion, water quality, and carbon sequestration (Hajkowicz et al.  276 
2009). The CRP, for example, uses the Environmental Benefits Index while some agricultural  277 
land preservation programs use the Land Evaluation and Site Assessment (LESA) system. EQIP  278 
uses a ratio of value of the benefit index (BI) to the cost to achieve statutorily mandated cost- 279 
effectiveness in securing environmental benefits (Cattaneo 2003). These indices capture well the  280 
services that landowners supply; however, they do not correspond to the value society places on  281 
the supply of such services (Smith 2006).   282 
Note that efforts to monetize public welfare can lead to systematic biases if income and  283 
net-benefit incidence are correlated and wealth is unequally distributed. This is a well-known  284 
challenge to all benefit-cost analyses.  Also, some find this assertion controversial if one does not  285 
believe that values for ecosystem services can be measured monetarily.  286 
Fortunately, monetized benefit measurement has advanced considerably over the past  287 
three decades. For instance, many applications measure the benefits of preserved land, and these  288 
benefits increase on-parcel and off-parcel human welfare (Bastian et al. 2002). Valuation  289 
techniques include revealed preferences (such as hedonic analysis) and stated preferences (such  290 
as contingent valuation and choice modeling). Future areas of research in this area include the  291 
influence of certain amenities, such as public access, spatial relationships, and different  292 
agricultural uses (Bergstrom & Ready 2009).  293 
Decision-makers have argued, incorrectly as will be shown, that nonmonetized benefit  294 
measures (benefit indices) equally promote cost-effectiveness, particularly if the indices use  295 
cardinal measures (the index employs units that reflect more than a ranking). Economists and  296 
other environmental researchers have employed sophisticated cardinal techniques for  297   16
aggregating preferences. Techniques include the analytic hierarchy process (see Ananda &  298 
Herath 2009) and the logic scoring of preferences (Allen et al. 2011), which can be used with  299 
groups of experts or the general public.  300 
Lesson 6: Benefit indices can lead to suboptimal project selection. Messer & Allen  301 
(2010:45–46) demonstrate how benefit indices, which are often averaged for the conservation  302 
project as a whole rather than assigned per acre, can lead to scaling problems. In effect, an  303 
averaged benefit index will be biased against large projects.  304 
Benefit indices also can map poorly into monetized benefits. This can be demonstrated by  305 
revisiting the example in table 2. Assume that monetized benefits are shown to be a linear  306 
function of the benefit index: $B=BI+7 (column D). Even with this simple, monotonically  307 
increasing relationship of just adding 7 (one can readily imagine a more complex relationships  308 
between $B and BI), this example shows that the BI-cost ratio (column K) produces a smaller  309 
total net benefit of $40 than the optimum of $44 (column L). This result may be counterintuitive,  310 
but it occurs because systematic mismeasurement of the monetized benefit reverses the rank of  311 
the selected projects. Although the values shown in table 2 were selected to demonstrate these  312 
points, the example demonstrates that an ostensibly reasonable cardinal BI can lead to smaller  313 
net benefits even when monetized benefits are a simple transformation.  314 
Lesson 7: Targeting conservation benefits leads to greater cost-effectiveness when  315 
thresholds are present. Conservation thresholds complicate optimal selection and exist when an  316 
environmental benefit depends on achieving some minimum level of conservation (Wu et al.  317 
2000; Wu & Skelton-Groth 2002; Wu 2004). Examples are when a minimum amount of habitat  318 
is needed to sustain an endangered species or a critical mass of farmland must remain to sustain a  319   17
region’s viable agricultural industry. Wu & Boggess (1999) offered an assessment on how  320 
thresholds complicate optimal selection. Wu et al. (2000) and Wu & Skelton-Groth (2002)  321 
extended that work with empirical evidence about how targeting conservation leads to greater  322 
cost effectiveness when thresholds exist for fish habitat protection.  323 
  Lesson 8: Interrelationships (correlations and interactions) among conservation  324 
projects are often unobserved.  This is especially true when readily available benefit measures  325 
such as soil quality drive the selection process. Studies have examined how targeting  326 
conservation leads to optimal selections when projects are interrelated (Wu & Boggess 1999).  327 
Interrelationships can take many forms. For instance, preserving habitat on two contiguous  328 
parcels will likely deliver greater joint benefits than two discontiguous parcels, all else equal. In  329 
other words, spatial scale matters and there can be a spatial agglomeration of benefits. An  330 
interrelationship also may exist between two different types of ecosystem services, such as  331 
riparian protection that improves the land-based and the aquatic habitat. A number of studies  332 
have examined efforts involving agglomeration bonuses to incentivize landowners to coordinate  333 
their behavior (see Parkhurst et al. (2002); Parkhurst & Shogren (2007); Drechsler et al. (2010)).   334 
Many studies have sought to spatially model environmental benefits (see van der Horst  335 
(2007)), however, fewer studies have examined monetized benefits spatially (Bateman et al.  336 
2003; Hynes et al. 2010; Campbell et al. 2009). van der Horst (2006, 2007) developed a method  337 
for considering multiple benefits in space and calculating effectiveness gains from spatial  338 
targeting of two benefits, which is then assessed via an analysis of the Farmland Woodland  339 
Premium Scheme in Scotland. Wu (2004) argued that lack of information, rather than a failure to  340   18
recognize the interrelationships, has led to the current policy environment, which tends to focus  341 
on specific resources rather than the more complex ecosystems relationships.  342 
Lesson 9: Optimal selection accounts for development risk. Conservation decisions  343 
typically are made with uncertainty about future benefit supply. Some projects supply benefits  344 
even in the absence of conservation, while others risk diminution or destruction. Therefore,  345 
researchers promote and many planners desire conservation targeted at the most vulnerable  346 
benefits first, though there so far is no consensus on how best to do this. For instance, Messer  347 
(2006) argues that development threat can be predicted from observable parcel characteristics  348 
(location, soil quality, proximity to highways, etc.) that can in turn give weights to various  349 
benefit measures prior to optimization. Because development risk tends to vary directly with  350 
cost, Newburn et al. (2005) offered an approach to optimal selection (benefit-loss-cost targeting)  351 
that allows risk and costs to be assessed jointly. Costello & Polasky (2004) developed an optimal  352 
dynamic selection model that accounts for development risk and found that heuristic selection  353 
performs reasonably well when a dynamic problem becomes too large. Nonmarket valuation  354 
offers an additional perspective as it directly estimates the marginal benefit of preserving lands at  355 
various levels of development risk. Johnston & Duke (2007) estimated higher benefits from  356 
preservation of parcels at the highest risk of development.  357 
Lesson 10: The policy process impacts the conservation benefit received. Empirical  358 
evidence demonstrates that the public cares about how and by whom conservation benefits are  359 
secured, where the policy process refers to the policy used and administering entity. Many  360 
policies exist to deliver conservation services and, furthermore, these services can be delivered  361 
by governmental agencies or nongovernmental organizations. These groups preserve land with  362   19
easements or fee simple ownership, and governments can use zoning/regulatory mechanisms.   363 
Water quality, for example, may be enhanced by regulations, incentive programs such as the  364 
CRP, government-sponsored relocation of nutrients, tax instruments, or nutrient trading.   365 
Johnston & Duke (2007) found, in the case of farmland, that mandatory governmental zoning  366 
was viewed by the public negatively compared to a voluntary state easement program that was  367 
viewed more favorably and therefore delivered higher monetized benefits. Of course, the costs of  368 
these efforts can be different as some studies have shown zoning, while controversial, to be  369 
relatively low cost and effective (Ozama and Tertley, 2007).  370 
Lesson 11: Markets will tend to capitalize location-specific benefits. For example, a  371 
house will tend to increase in value if it borders a newly protected preserve or farm (Geoghegan  372 
2002; Irwin 2002; Netusil 2005; Geoghegan et al. 2003). Property values will even increase if  373 
proximity to a conserved area allows for access to newly supplied services such as nature trails.  374 
Although potential capitalization does not invalidate conservation benefits, competitive rental  375 
markets can drive renters to indifference (Landsburg 1993:34–37), i.e., owners may increase rent  376 
to account for the enhanced environment. This obviously represents a potential equity problem:  377 
because capital owners tend to be wealthier than nonowners, thus, capitalization will tend to lead  378 
to some efficiency mismeasurement (Duke & Johnston 2011). This is an area for future research  379 
as researchers have not yet devised definitive advice on how to integrate capitalization into  380 
analyses of public good supply. Also, not all conservation benefits will be location-specific (e.g.,  381 
endangered species protection) so capitalization will not complicate all selection problems.  382 
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4.3 Costs  384 
Lesson 12:  Include and fully account for all costs. Optimal selection requires data on the  385 
projects’ costs, and Naidoo et al. (2006) offers a thorough accounting of why and how costs  386 
should be used in conservation planning.  Although markets do supply some project cost data,  387 
such as the cost of acquiring the land or easement, economists note that optimality requires  388 
accounting for all costs—and this is directly related to a landowner’s willingness to participate in  389 
programs (Miller et al. 2011). Frequently ignored factors include in-kind costs such as volunteer  390 
labor and external costs such as increased nuisance species. Likewise, costs should be estimated  391 
for future management and restoration costs. Naidoo et al. (2006:682) offers a typology of these  392 
costs, and Wilson et al. (2009:242) presents an extensive list of costs and associated research  393 
studies. Moilanen and Arponen (2011) address more complicated planning situations, such as  394 
when priorities must be set though future costs are uncertain.  395 
Lesson 13: Costs should be monetized. Naidoo et al. (2006) describes efforts to proxy  396 
with nonmonetized costs and argues that simple averages ignore spatial heterogeneity while  397 
more advanced estimates can sufficiently capture variation. Carwardine et al. (2010) extends this  398 
work by assessing how sensitive optimal prioritization is to levels of cost uncertainty.   399 
Lesson 14: Sequential assessment of benefits and then costs tends to be suboptimal.  400 
To understand this potential pitfall, consider again the DALP easement program that uses a  401 
LESA benefit index to score all applicant parcels and then selects a subset of parcels that exceed  402 
a minimum score for further consideration (3 Del. C. § 9-908(a)(4)). The high-scoring parcels  403 
are then sorted by the owners’ offered discounts (i.e., cost targeting) (3 Del. C. § 9-914(b)(3)).  404 
While this selection method analyzes benefits and costs, the sequential approach cannot  405   21
guarantee optimality. Consider a hypothetical example where high-benefit project A offers a  406 
benefit of 10 and a cost of 9, project B offers a benefit of 9 and a cost of 9, and low-benefit  407 
projects C, D, and E each offer a benefit of 7 and a cost of 3. Assume the benefits reflect all  408 
relevant conservation data. With a budget of 9, cost-effectiveness will select C, D, and E,  409 
conserving three projects for total net benefits of 12. Sequential analysis would immediately  410 
eliminate C, D, and E and focus on A and B. If A is chosen, the budget would be exhausted and  411 
the net benefit would be just one. Thus, the sequential approach may seem to control the cost of  412 
seeking high-benefit projects, but it is generally suboptimal.  413 
  414 
4.4 Budgets  415 
Lesson 15: Large budgets allow conservation of all projects, any selection strategy will be  416 
optimal (Babcock et al. 1997). While this lesson is straightforward, it is important to recall that  417 
the differences in selection strategy arise when budgets are limited. Furthermore, the more  418 
limited the program’s budget, the greater the potential gain from optimal prioritization.   419 
Lesson 16: Optimization improves cost-effectiveness when budget remainders are  420 
significant. Remainders are a significant problem with limited budgets. Large remainders are  421 
most likely when budgets are severely limited, especially when project costs are high relative to  422 
the budget, when agencies cannot implement projects in fractions, and when budgets cannot be  423 
carried over into new periods. Such gains are a key difference between BCT and optimization  424 
(Messer 2006). Consider that BCT might select the ten highest-ratio projects before finding that  425 
project 11 exceeds the budget remainder, at which point the algorithm looks further down the list  426 
for the next affordable project (say, project 20). Optimization, in contrast, searches for the set of  427   22
projects that maximizes the net benefit (say, projects 1 through 9, 11, and 12). Optimization thus  428 
can find that projects 11 and 12 produce greater net benefits than projects 10 and 20.   429 
Lesson 17: Intertemporal complications can limit potential cost-effectiveness.  If  430 
severe enough, intertemporal issues (decision making over time) can lead to a selection of  431 
parcels that is optimal today, but viewed from a broader time horizon would be suboptimal. This  432 
can be referred to as myopic optimality. At a basic level, simply carrying budget remainders over  433 
to future periods can improve cost-effectiveness by avoiding problems with budget remainders  434 
and spending out budgets on low-priority projects. Cost-effectiveness becomes significantly  435 
more complicated when the future availability of projects is uncertain or the conservation benefit  436 
is time limited (extinction of a species or nonrenewability threshold). Costello & Polasky (2004)  437 
assessed optimal selection in an intertemporal optimization problem and found, in part, that  438 
budgets available in early periods deliver much greater benefits. Meir et al. (2004) formulated  439 
the problem of dynamic budgets when benefits and project availability are uncertain and found  440 
that a relatively simple, opportunistic selection strategy can outperform myopic solutions.   441 
Lesson 18: Cooperation among conservation entities can help mitigate  442 
intertemporal issues. This cooperation can insure against the risk that any one entity cannot  443 
afford to secure an opportunistic project. One strategy common in the conservation community is  444 
for a nongovernmental entity to acquire opportunistic projects and then transfer them to a  445 
government agency once the governmental budget is renewed.  446 
  447 
  448 
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4.5 Incentive Problems  450 
Conservation policy is an imperfect instrument and incentive problems may arise. Incentive  451 
problems occur when, in response to a new policy, the “wrong” landowners signup (adverse  452 
selection) or landowners alter their behavior in ways that work against the goals of the policy  453 
(unintended consequences).  454 
Lesson 19: Adverse selection creates incentive problems that work against cost- 455 
effective conservation policy. Adverse selection arises because landowners typically have  456 
private information about the costs of delivering conservation services. For instance, a planner  457 
cannot observe how likely (or costly) it would be for a landowner to expand riparian buffers  458 
without a policy incentive to do so. Voluntary conservation policy will tend to attract landowners  459 
who are already most likely to deliver the conservation services, if planners do not distinguish  460 
landowners by their propensity to deliver services. If owners who would already be willing to  461 
supply benefits participate in a conservation program (wrong types), then some benefits are  462 
erroneously attributed to the program. As programs incur costs to secure participation, they may  463 
incur these costs without significant conservation gains on the ground. Likewise, the  464 
conservation gains can be overstated as comparisons are not made to the outcomes that would  465 
occur in the absence of the program. In these cases, the analysis that was based on observed  466 
benefits and costs is invalidated. Adverse selection will be exacerbated when programs use CT  467 
or reverse auctions to secure participation (Arnold et al. 2010). While the landowners’ costs are  468 
not observable, the landowners most likely to offer conservation services at a low price tend to  469 
be those inclined to conservation already.  470   24
Some recent conservation efforts have sought to address adverse selection with the  471 
concept of additionality. In carbon programs, for example, landowners currently pursuing  472 
sequestration (via no-tillage) are not eligible to sell carbon credits. Planners are addressing  473 
complications that come with implementation, such as costly monitoring, questions of equity  474 
(early adopters are sometimes punished), and complicated dynamic issues (a farmer could till  475 
this year so the farmer could enter a program next year).  476 
Wu & Babcock (1996) offered an early analysis of adverse selection that evaluated  477 
information asymmetry (i.e., the government is unaware of landowners’ costs) in the context of  478 
the CRP. Their mechanism sorted landowners and achieved participation by the best attainable  479 
method (this is known as second-best optimality, where the first-best outcome is unavailable  480 
because of information asymmetry). An empirical study by Kirwan et al. (2005) examined  481 
landowner behavior in CRP auctions and found evidence that 10–40% of the funds were  482 
premiums (i.e., payments above the cost of supplying the conservation service), suggesting that  483 
adverse selection may be present. Recent studies have examined ways to reduce adverse  484 
selection using theory and existing program data from the United Kingdom’s Environmental  485 
Stewardship Scheme (Fraser 2009; Quillerou & Fraser 2010). Arnold et al. (2010) used game  486 
theory and lab experiments to compare the impact of adverse selection on the cost-effectiveness  487 
of various conservation policies. They found that tax instruments are more efficient than reverse  488 
auctions, mechanism designs, and an absence of policy in the presence of adverse selection.  489 
Lesson 20: Unintended consequences of conservation policy may be impossible to  490 
fully control. In evaluating the CRP, Wu (2000) described the problem of slippage. Because the  491 
CRP is a voluntary program and does not regulate land uses, landowners can bring previously  492   25
unfarmed land into production to compensate for land they enroll in the CRP. Wu found that 20  493 
acres were converted for every 100 acres enrolled, thus offsetting as much as 14% of the  494 
environmental benefits. Any type of incentive-based land-retirement program will likely be  495 
vulnerable to this type of unintended consequence.   496 
Mixed-use land markets present a related problem. For instance, some conservation  497 
efforts produce benefits that accrue in part to neighboring parcels, which will increase in value.  498 
If a neighboring parcel is undeveloped, its relative value for development increases, which in  499 
turn raises the likelihood it will be developed or at least increase the costs of future conservation.  500 
Armsworth et al. (2006) examined this phenomenon in the context of biodiversity conservation.  501 
  502 
5. Conclusion  503 
Although the theory of cost-effective conservation is straightforward, several decades of research  504 
show that significant complications arise in real conservation planning situations. These issues  505 
may partly explain planners’ failure to use optimization methods. Lack of familiarity is surely  506 
another. Drawing from evidence from conservation programs in the United States, this paper  507 
offers a broad new synthesis of the benefits and challenges associated with cost-effective  508 
conservation.  The 20 lessons presented can answer many common questions about optimal  509 
selection processes and can guide planners in government agencies and large conservation  510 
organizations to more effectively employ their budgets.  511 
The first objective of the paper was to establish a working definition of cost-effective  512 
conservation as incorporating both benefits and costs that are measured commensurately with  513 
money. The paper distinguished the concepts of optimization from its close relatives, such as  514   26
BCT, and compared the results of optimization to those of less effective selection strategies, such  515 
as CT and BT. Twenty lessons were gleaned from this review regarding the problems of limiting  516 
optimal selection with political constraints, using a nonmonetized benefit measures or benefit  517 
indices, ignoring development risk, using incomplete cost measures, and employing cost  518 
measures sequentially or as benefit indices. The paper highlighted complications associated with  519 
interrelationships between benefits, issues of capitalization, and intertemporal planning. The  520 
manuscript also identifies challenges that need more research guidance including incentive  521 
problems and concepts of adverse selection, additionality, and slippage.  522 
The implications of this synthesis are controversial, especially for those concerned about  523 
monetizing environmental benefits in social terms. Because these lessons are suggested to guide  524 
the selection of which conservation projects yield the most benefits and not whether the benefits  525 
of environmental policy outweigh cost (such as the case with traditional cost benefit analysis)  526 
hopefully this will not be as negatively viewed by environmental planners and policymakers.  527 
Ultimately, conservation planning cannot be reduced to a simple dichotomy of cost-effective  528 
versus cost-ineffective. Rather, it is a complicated process—one that is context-dependent and  529 
subject to significant information problems. That said, following these lessons can help planners  530 
do considerably better with their scarce resources and help lawmakers and policymakers design  531 
institutions that are likely to deliver greater conservation benefits from a given budget. The  532 
lessons also suggest ways for planners to determine whether the costs of acquiring improved data  533 
are less than the benefit provided by improved selection.  Ideally, as policy development  534 
processes seek greater cost-effectiveness and then communicate prioritized needs for further  535 
study, researchers can target their studies to deliver the greatest return on their efforts. 536   27
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expansion equal success? Land Economics 86:219-244.  811 Table 1.  Summary of Twenty Lessons for Cost-Effective Conservation Planning.  
Optimal Selection  Benefits    Costs  Budgets  Incentive Problems 
1. Benefit targeting 
and cost targeting 









will tend to be 
suboptimal 
3. Measure conservation 
benefits that are positive 
externalities.   
4. Measure benefits to the 
public, not to experts 
5. Monetize benefit 
measures 
6. Benefits indices can 
lead to suboptimal project 
selection 
7. Targeting conservation 
benefits leads to greater 
cost-effectiveness when 





are often unobserved. 
 
9. Optimal selection 
accounts for 
development risk 
10. The policy 
process impacts the 
conservation benefits 
received 
11. Markets will tend 
to capitalize location-
specific benefits 
12. Include and 
fully account for 
all costs 
 





benefits and then 
costs will tend to 
be suboptimal 
15. Large budgets allow 
conservation of all 
projects, any selection 
strategy will be optimal 
16. Optimization improves 
cost-effectiveness when 
budget remainders are 
significant 
17. Intertemporal 
complications can limit 
potential cost-
effectiveness 
18. Cooperation among 
conservation entities can 
help mitigate intertemporal 
issues 
19. Adverse selection 
creates incentive 
problems that work 
against cost-effective 
conservation policy. 
20.  Unintended 
consequences of 
conservation policy 




Table 2:  Hypothetical Example of Ranking and Benefit-Index Suboptimality 
 
Panel A: Hypothetical Project Costs, Benefit Index, and Monetized Benefits  
A B C  D  E  F  G 











A $1 11  $18  $17  11.0  18.0 
B $2  8  $15  $13  4.0  7.5 
C $3 10  $17  $14  3.3  5.7 
D $5 21  $28  $23  4.2  5.6 
E $1.5 1  $8  $6.5 0.7  5.3 
F $1.5 1  $8  $6.5 0.7  5.3 
 
Panel B: Hypothetical Project Prioritization and Selection with $6 Budget 











st D  A A  A 
2
nd   A  E  D  B 
3
rd C  F B  C 
4
th B  B C  D 
5
th E  C E  E 
6
th F  D F  F 
Projects selected 
with $6 budget 
 
DA AEFB  AD  ABC 
Sum of Net 
Benefits ($NB)  40 43  40  44   36
 